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Locating an Optimal Site for a Controversial Facility?
Jean-Baptiste Tondji
Department of Economics and Finance, The University of Texas Rio Grande Valley
1201 W. University Dr., ECOBE 216, Edinburg, Texas, 78539, U.S.A

Abstract
We consider a situation in which policymakers in a local community choose an optimal
site for a controversial and essential project in a dynamic setting. Policymakers have
either single-dipped or multi-dipped preferences over a Euclidean space of possible
locations. We provide two existence results for this issue. Furthermore, we show that
two optimal sites (at most) exist if policymakers have single-dipped preferences over a
one-dimensional site space.
Keywords: Public bads, Single-dipped (Multi-dipped) preferences, Optimality.
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1. Introduction
Scholars and policymakers have demonstrated a growing interest in locating controversial facilities, as surveyed by Aldrich (2010) in his recent book. Governments often
face fundamental siting issues as they attempt to build or expand public projects that
serve residents’ needs but potentially bring negative externalities into their targeted
communities. Recent examples include, among others, the Enbridge Northern Gateway
Pipelines, and the Trans Mountain Expansion Projects in Canada, and the fracking
boom in the United States. States must choose among many possible policy instruments to handle local resistance, ranging from strong-arm tactics of coercion and rigid
social control to more peaceful incentives and inducements. Addressing issues on where
to locate and how to overcome civil society have significant implications for the design
and implementation of public policies towards protecting both environment and human
well-being.
In this paper, we look at how residents of a local community interact peacefully in a
democratic institution to address the problem of locating a stable and efficient site
for a public facility, such as a windmill park, a garbage dumping ground, or a nuclear
plant. Such public projects are called public bads: residents agree about their value
but typically do not want them in their backyards. We assume that the public bad
is either within a one-dimensional space or a multi-dimensional space. In the former,
each resident has a single-dipped preference over the set of possible (or feasible) sites:
there is the worst point, called the dip, and the resident’s satisfaction increases with the
Euclidean distance from this dip. In the latter, we assume that each resident may have
a multi-dipped preference: a resident may have multiple local dips over the site space.
In the community, the Council (a finite group of political representatives, henceforth
called legislators) adopts the policy through voting. A vote then consists of reporting
one’s dip. We assume that legislators are rational, truthful, and vote according to their
constituents’ preferences. A location for the public bad is adopted if (1) there is an
endless cycle of voting: legislators agree on the public bad’s site, and (2) the chosen
2
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site is efficient: there is no other site which would be preferred by all legislators to
the chosen site. When (1) and (2) are satisfied, the council has chosen an optimal site
for the project. The main issue is that legislators may have antagonistic tastes upon
locating the public facility, then render uncertain the outcome of this social decision
by voting.
Legislators make decisions under a three-stage mechanism, L, described as follows.
In the first stage, a majority coalition S can object against the status quo site x by
proposing an alternative site y. Otherwise, the status quo remains, and the voting
ends, or Nature ends the voting process after S proposes y. In the second stage, each
legislator who is not a member of S can oppose y. Otherwise, y becomes the new site,
which ends the process. However, if there is any opposition, S has the right to either
withdraw or maintain y. If S withdraws y, the status quo x remains in place, and
the process ends. However, if S maintains y, then the opposing legislators can invite
other legislators to form a majority coalition T to replace y with another site z in the
third and final stage. If T succeeds, z is elected, and the process ends. Otherwise, the
Council elects y in the final stage.
We use majority rule to allocate decisive power among coalition of legislators. Thus, if
n is the size of the council, then any coalition of legislators that consists of more than
n/2 is a majority. We say that a given site x is stable if it cannot be overruled by a
majority of legislators if it is submitted to a possible reform or amendment under the
three-stage mechanism described above. If the decision-making process ends with a site
x, and the latter is efficient, then x is optimal and will be adopted for the community.
Otherwise, the council adjourns.
We prove that there exists an optimal (stable and efficient) site of the public bad when
the location space is one-dimensional (Theorem 1) or multi-dimensional (Theorem 2).
In addition, if preferences over a one-dimensional site space are single-dipped, then the
council can select at most two optimal sites for the public bad (Theorem 1).

3
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Scholars in social sciences have demonstrated interests in addressing where and how to
locate a public bad. Early theory suggests a deep involvement of citizen participation
through local referenda allowing residents to vote for or against the public facility
(see, for example, Mitchell and Carson (1986)). In his book on siting issues and civil
society, Aldrich (2010) debates the patterns by which most controversial projects are
sited in France, Japan, and United States, and the policy instruments used by these
countries to handle civil opposition when it arises. Other studies assume that individual
preferences over the set of possible sites are single-dipped and focus on defining and
characterizing collective rules, in which each agent has the incentives to reveal his or
her sincere preferences (see, for example, Ehlers (2002), Barberà et al. (2012), Öztürk
et al. (2013), Manjunath (2014), Öztürk et al. (2014), Lahiri et al. (2016), and Peters
et al. (2017)). In a direct revelation mechanism setting, Yamamura (2016) analyzes
the choice of locating a public bad from a coalitional standpoint using the equilibrium
concepts of strong Nash equilibrium and coalition proof Nash equilibrium.
Our work contributes to this existing literature. Previous studies, however, have focused mostly on static decision-making mechanisms. While real-life institutions use
static mechanisms, most institutions also employ dynamic procedures, wherein a proposed policy generally goes through a sequence of amendments before its final adoption
(see, for example, Baron and Ferejohn (1989) and Chwe (1994)). In this paper, we use
a dynamic legislative mechanism to determine the existence of an optimal (efficient
and stable) site for a controversial facility when legislators are truthful and display
specific preferences over the location space. While the result of Theorem 1 is consistent with early works on one-dimensional location space, we extend the analysis on
multi-dimensional spaces, and we show that within such domains, the optimality is
preserved.
We start by introducing notations and the main definitions in Section 2. In Section 3,
we determine the existence of an optimal location for a controversial facility when legislators have either single-dipped or multi-dipped preferences over a Euclidean location
4
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space. Section 4 concludes.
2. Setup
This section provides formal and brief notations of the basic concepts that we use
throughout the paper.
2.1. The Council
The council is labeled as C = (N, A, M, L, (i )i∈N ), where N is the finite set of legislators (with |N | = n ≥ 2), A is the Euclidean site space, M is the majority rule (or
the set of majority coalitions), L is the legislative voting mechanism, and (i )i∈N is
the profile of legislators’ preferences over the set A. The site space A represents the set
of feasible sites at stake. We assume that A is a one-dimensional or multidimensional
space.
2.2. Preferences
For x, y ∈ A, y i x indicates that legislator i weakly prefers y to x; y i x indicates
that legislator i prefers y to x; and y ∼i x indicates that legislator i is indifferent
between y and x. Given the nature of the site space, we assume that preferences are
continuous. Preference continuity is a natural assumption which means that a legislator
who prefers a site x over another site y prefers any site close enough to x over any site
close enough to y. This implies that a small perturbation of the site space does not
radically change preferences. This structure of preferences is generally encountered in
economic theory. Formally, the binary relation i is said to be continuous if for any
site x, y ∈ A, such that y is preferred to x (y i x), there exists a neighborhood S(x)
of x and a neighborhood S(y) of y such that site z is preferred to site t (z i t) for
every sites z ∈ S(y) and t ∈ S(x). In this paper, we use two classes of continuous
preferences: single-dipped and multi-dipped preferences.

5
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2.3. Optimal Sites
The council decides on the choice of a site under the three-stage legislative mechanism,
L, that we presented in the Introduction. Below, we describe the rational behavior of
legislators within the mechanism.
Let us assume that a status quo site x ∈ A is at stake in the Council. A group of
legislators might gather together in a majority coalition, say S and object to the status
quo if there exists another alternative, say y, which they prefer to x, i.e., y S x. This
condition is a natural requirement that appears in all two-stage bargaining models of
rationality in the literature (see, for example, Aumann and Maschler (1964) and all
of the subsequent studies inspired by this paper). We can also view the condition as
an expression of prudence or ambiguity aversion. It expresses that the majority S
considers the presence of Nature in the voting process and cannot fully predict the
future of the game after introducing the proposal y.
After the objection (y, S), a legislator i from the remaining group of council (N \ S)
may be worse off at y (i.e., not(y i x)), and decides to join another majority coalition
T which could propose another site z to the Council, i.e., z T y. In that case, a
pair (z, T ) ∈ Z × M is a counter-objection against the objection (y, S) if z T y and
not(y T x). Also, legislators of T have to consider the fact that the first majority
coalition S may withdraw their support for the change of the status quo x in case the
new proposition z could hurt some of its legislators, i.e., not(z S x). If the latter
occurs, then the counter-objection is unfriendly against S. In the Council, a majority
S will initiate the first move against the status quo x by proposing a new site y against
x if there is no unfriendly counter-objection against (y, S), i.e., (z S x); then the
objection (y, S) is considered to be justified.
A stable site is an option in A against which no justified objection exists. In other
words, a stable site is an alternative such that if it is the status quo, no majority
coalition will seek to replace it. More formally, a site, say y ∈ A defeats another site

6
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x, labeled by y m x, if there exists a majority coalition S ∈ M (y mS x) such that:
1. y S x and;
2. ∀(z, T ) ∈ A × M, S 6= T, [z T y and not(y T x)] implies [z S x].
The set of stable sites, denoted by O(C), contains sites that are not defeated in the
council C. A decision is adopted if legislators reach an agreement at the end of the
legislative procedure, i.e., O(C) 6= ∅, and the outcome of this agreement is efficient. The
set O(C) is also called the reciprocity set in Pongou and Tondji (2018b). By addressing
a different question, they prove that the legislative procedure, L, in this study induces
legislators to take reciprocal actions. The formalization of rational behavior in the
Council follows the traditional blocking approach in coalitional games (see, for example,
Harsanyi (1974), Chwe (1994), Dutta et al. (2005), Ray and Vohra (2014), and Dutta
and Vohra (2017)). However, following the bargaining approach (see, for example, Nash
(1953), Kimya (2020), and Serrano (2020)), the three-stage mechanism also implements
the set of optimal outcomes in some subgame perfect Nash equilibrium concept. This
additional extension and a comparison of the mechanism to other procedures that
follows the blocking approach can be found in Pongou and Tondji (2018a,b). The
following result reduces the selection of optimal sites.
Lemma 1 (Pongou and Tondji (2018b)) Let C = (N, A, M, L, (i )i∈N ) be a council and x ∈ A be a site. Assume that O(C) 6= ∅. If x ∈ O(C), then x is efficient.

2

The intuition behind this result follows from the fact that the dynamic mechanism, L,
induces legislators to adopt farsighted and reciprocal behaviors. No potential second
majority T will react against a first majority S who replaces a status quo site x with an
alternative y that Pareto-dominates x. Opposing such a move would cause the majority
S to withdraw y, thus allowing x to remain in place and inducing the persistence of a
less preferred site by all the legislators.
Lemma 1 shows that any stable site is efficient. It follows that, the optimal decision
7
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of the Council is guaranteed if stability succeeds. Throughout the remaining of the
paper, the set O(C) consists of the optimal sites for the public bad. In the next section,
we derive the main results of the paper.
3. Results
We first establish the existence of an optimal site when preferences are single-dipped. A
preference relation over a space is said to be single-dipped if; the sites can be ordered as
points on a line; the preference relation has a least preferred point–dip or worse point;
and, points further away from the least point are more preferred. Formally, assume
that all the sites are ordered by a binary relation denoted θ, and all individuals perceive
them as being arranged in this order. An individual i of the council has a single-dipped
preference i , if there exists a site xi such that: (1) for any other site x 6= xi , x i xi ;
and (2) for any site x, y ∈ A, it holds that: if (xi θ y θ x) or (x θ y θ xi ), then x i y.
Theorem 1 Let C = (N, A, M, L, (i )i∈N ) be a council where, A is a one-dimension
site space, and where preferences are single-dipped. Then, an optimal site exists, and
there are at most two optimal sites.

2

We relegate the proof of Theorem 1 in the appendix.
Theorem 1 is consistent with other studies on the site of a public bad under strategyproof and efficient rules. Strategy-proofness avoids members’ improvement of satisfaction or gains by misrepresenting their true preferences, and efficiency ensures that all
members’ satisfaction cannot improve by changing the chosen site of a public bad. As
mentioned above, any stable site under the three-stage mechanism used in the Council
is efficient. Manjunath (2014) studies the site of a public bad when agents have singledipped preferences over a closed interval [0, T ]. He proves that the range of an efficient
and strategy-proof rule is the set {0, T }, the domain’s two extremes. In another study,
Barberà et al. (2012) proves that the range of strategy-proof rules under single-dipped
preferences contains two alternatives at most. These studies focus exclusively on static
8
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decision-making mechanisms. Theorem 1 provides the same characterization in a dynamic voting mechanism. In our setting, each legislator has at most two peak (the
most preferred) points and, those sites coincide with the minimum and maximum elements of A. Therefore, these two bounds are the optimal sites when preferences are
single-dipped. Below, we illustrate our result in a Council consisting of three (n = 3)
and four (n = 4) legislators.
3.1. Illustrations
Let x ∈ A be a site and define the number S(x) as the number of legislators who have x
as a peak point (the most preferred point). If no legislator has x as a peak point, then
S(x) takes the value 0. Let V (q, q 0 ) denote the set of legislators who prefer q against q 0
in a choice between q and q 0 : V (q, q 0 ) = {i ∈ N : q i q 0 }. We differentiate two cases:
each legislator has only one peak over the set A, or at least one legislator has two peak
sites. In what follows, qm is legislator m’s dip point, m = 1, 2, 3, 4. Legislators have
single-dipped preferences. Therefore, they prefer to vote for sites far away from their
dip points.
3.1.1. Illustration I: a 3-legislator Council
We consider two cases and determine the optimal sites.
Case a: S(q1 ) = 1, S(q2 ) = 0, and S(q3 ) = 2 (see Figure 1).

q2

{2, 3}

q1

{1, 2}

{1, 2}
q1

q2

q3

(a) Preferences

(b) Popularity graph

Figure 1: The Council’s size is 3 and each legislator has a unique peak
The popularity graph among sites based on preferences is provided in Figure 1b (the
arrows indicate the direction of the popularity relationship; for instance q1 is a more
9
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q3

popular site than q2 because q1 is preferred over q2 by the majority coalition {2, 3}).
From Figure 1a and Figure 1b, we note that V (q1 , q2 ) = {2, 3}, V (q3 , q1 ) = {1, 2}, and
V (q3 , q2 ) = {1, 2}. It follows that although, q1 23 q2 , the site q1 does not defeat q2
because there exists the alternative q3 with q3 12 q1 , not(q1 12 q2 ), and not(q3 23 q2 ).
Given that q3 12 q1 , and q3 12 q2 , and no other alternative is preferred to q3 , it follows
that q3 defeats q1 and q2 thanks to coalition {1, 2}, and there is no site which defeats
option q3 . Hence, q3 m12 q1 , q3 m12 q2 , and O(C) = {q3 }.
Case b: S(q1 ) = 2, S(q2 ) = 0, and S(q3 ) = 2 (see Figure 2).

q1
q1

q2

{2, 3}

q2

{1, 2}

q3

(b) Popularity graph

q3

(a) Preferences

Figure 2: The Council’s size is 3; Legislators 1 and 3 have one peak site, while Legislator
2 has two peaks
From Figure 2a and Figure 2b, we have what follows. The majority {2, 3} prefers q1
to q2 (q1 23 q2 ), and the majority {1, 2} prefers q3 to q2 (q3 12 q2 ). When it comes
to the choice between q1 and q3 , we have : V (q1 , q3 ) = {3} and V (q3 , q1 ) = {1}. It is
straightforward to note that no other alternative is preferred by a majority to either
q1 or q3 . Therefore, the site q2 is defeated by either q1 or q3 and no site defeats either
q1 or q3 . Hence, O(C) = {q1 , q3 }.
3.1.2. Illustration II: a 4-legislator Council
As in Section 3.1.1, we assume that legislators admit at most two peak sites.
Case c: Each legislator has only one peak point. We illustrate this case in Figure 3
and Figure 4. We start with the illustration displayed in Figure 3.
Using Figure 3, we get the following results: V (q1 , q2 ) = V (q1 , q3 ) = {2, 3, 4} and
10
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q2
q1

q2 q3

{2, 3, 4}

q1

{2, 3, 4}

{1, 2, 3}

q3

q4

(b) Popularity graph

q4

(a) Preferences

Figure 3: The Council’s size is 4 and each legislator has a unique peak (S(q1 ) = 2,
S(q2 ) = S(q3 ) = 0, and S(q4 ) = 2)
V (q2 , q1 ) = V (q3 , q1 ) = {1}. Given that there is no other alternative that is preferred
to q1 , it follows that q1 defeats q3 and q2 with the support of coalition {2, 3, 4}. Continuing with the same argument, given that V (q3 , q4 ) = {4} and V (q4 , q3 ) = {1, 2, 3}, it
follows that q4 defeats q3 with the support of majority {1, 2, 3}. Note that V (q1 , q4 ) =
V (q2 , q3 ) = V (q2 , q4 ) = {3, 4}, and V (q4 , q1 ) = V (q3 , q2 ) = V (q4 , q2 ) = {1, 2}. As result, the only non-defeated sites are the two peak points q1 and q4 . Hence, q1 m234 q2 ,
q1 m234 q3 , q4 m123 q3 , and O(C) = {q1 , q4 }.
We continue our analysis with the illustration in Figure 4.

q2
q1

{2, 3, 4}

q1

{1, 2, 3}

q3

(b) Popularity graph

q2 q3 q4

(a) Preferences

Figure 4: The Council’s size is 4, each legislator has a unique peak (S(q1 ) = 2, S(q2 ) =
S(q3 ) = 0, and S(q4 ) = 2), and Legislator 2 is indifferent between sites q1 and q3
The main difference from Figure 3 and Figure 4 is that Legislator 2 is indifferent
between sites q1 and q3 (q1 ∼2 q3 ). Therefore, V (q1 , q3 ) = {3, 4}, V (q3 , q1 ) = {1},
and q1 does not defeat q3 . However, as in the previous case, V (q1 , q2 ) = {2, 3, 4},
V (q2 , q1 ) = {1}, V (q3 , q4 ) = {4}, and V (q4 , q3 ) = {1, 2, 3}. Using Figure 4b, we
conclude that q1 defeats q2 with the support of coalition {2, 3, 4}, and q4 defeats q3
11
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q4

with the support of majority {1, 2, 3}. Given that V (q1 , q4 ) = V (q2 , q4 ) = {3, 4}, and
V (q4 , q1 ) = V (q4 , q2 ) = {1, 2}, it follows that the only non-defeated sites are the two
peak points q1 and q4 so that O(C) = {q1 , q4 }.
Case d: There exists one legislator who has two peak points. We illustrate this case
in Figure 5.

q1 q2

q3

q4

q1

q2 q3 q4

(b) Preferences for n = 4 and q1 ∼2 q3

(a) Preferences for n = 4

Figure 5: The Council’s size is 4, and Legislator 3 has two peaks
We use the similar argument in Case c to derive the optimal sites. From Figure 5,
V (q1 , q2 ) = {2, 3, 4} and V (q2 , q1 ) = {1}, then q1 defeats q2 . Using Figure 5a, the
site q1 defeats q3 , because V (q1 , q3 ) = {2, 3, 4} and V (q3 , q1 ) = {1}. However, given
that, legislator 2 is indifferent between candidates q1 and q3 in Figure 5b, we have
V (q1 , q3 ) = {3, 4} and V (q3 , q1 ) = {1}, and the latter relationship between q1 and q3
does not stand. Using Figure 5, V (q1 , q4 ) = {4}, V (q4 , q1 ) = {1, 2}, V (q3 , q4 ) = {4}
and V (q4 , q3 ) = {1, 2, 3}. It follows that q4 defeats q3 , and O(C) = {q1 , q4 }.
3.2. Optimal Sites in a Multi-dimensional Location Space
In real-life situations, legislators may have beliefs (or positions) over social issues that
are not always ranked by a one-dimensional spectrum. In that case, the result of Theorem 1 is limited. Therefore, we assume that legislators in the Council may also display
multi-dipped continuous preferences over a possibly multi-dimensional site space. In
what follows, we assume that the site space A is a compact and convex subset of the
k-dimensional Euclidean space (k < ∞). Following previous studies in economies with
multi-dimensional spaces (see, for example, Debreu (1969), Hildenbrand (1974)), we

12
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endow the site space A with the topology of closed convergence. We start the analysis
with the following definition.
Definition. Let i be a binary relation over a site space A. An alternative x ∈ A is
a local minimizer of i if there exists a neighborhood S(x) of x such that y i x, for
every y ∈ S(x).
Denote by LM (i , A) the set of all the local minimizers of the relation i . Note that, if
the preference i is a continuous binary relation over A, then LM (i , A) is a non-empty
Borel subset of A. The concepts of Borel set and the Lebesgue measure (denoted here
by L) have proven to be extremely useful in general equilibrium theory. Multi-dipped
preferences have one or many local minimizers that form a null set. An interesting
subclass of this class of preferences is the set of preferences that have countably many
local minimizers. We have the following result.
Theorem 2 Let C = (N, A, M, L, (i )i∈N ) be a Council where A is a k-dimensional
Euclidean site space (1 ≤ k < ∞), and where each preference i is such that:
L[LM (i , A)] = 0, for i = 1, 2, ..., n.
Then, an optimal site exists.

2

We relegate the proof of Theorem 2 in the appendix. Theorem 2 complements the
result of Theorem 1, and proved useful by guaranteeing positive results in a framework
where legislators may have several worst sites.
4. Conclusion
In this paper, we use a three-stage voting mechanism to derive two possible theorems
for enacting an optimal location for a controversial public project when policymakers’
preferences over the set of competing sites display specific structures. Specifically, we
help a council to site a public bad in a local community where residents have either
13
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single-dipped or multi-dipped preferences over a set of feasible sites. We show that
there exists at most two optimal sites if policymakers have single-dipped preferences
over a one-dimensional site space.
Appendix A. Proof of Results
Proof (Theorem 1) 1. Assume that n is odd. We distinguish two different
cases: each legislator has a unique peak point or there exists at least one legislator who
has two peak sites over A.
Case e: consider the situation where each legislator has a unique peak point over
A. Assume q1∗ and q3∗ to be the two possible peak points (this is possible since A
is bounded), then S(q1∗ ) + S(q3∗ ) = n, S(q1∗ ), S(q3∗ ) ≥ 0. Without loss of generality,
assume that S(q1∗ ) > S(q3∗ ), then S(q1∗ ) > n2 . Consider the following graph (Figure A.6)
described below.

q1∗ q

q2

q3∗

Figure A.6: The Council’s size is odd, and each legislator has a unique peak
In a choice between between peaks q1∗ and q3∗ in the Council, the alternative q1∗ wins,
because more than half of the council vote for q1∗ against q3∗ , since S(q1∗ ) > S(q3∗ ) and
S(q1∗ ) > n2 . In a choice between q1∗ and any site q ∈ (q1∗ , q3∗ ) such that S(q) = 0, q loses.
Indeed, the number of individuals who have q1∗ as dip point vote for q. It follows that,
at least, S(q1∗ ) individuals vote for q1∗ against q. Given that S(q1∗ ) > n2 , then q1∗ defeats
all other sites in A and O(C) = {q1∗ }.
Case f : Assume that there exists at least one legislator who has two peaks over A.
This situation can be illustrated by a graph similar to the one below (Figure A.7).

14
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q1∗

q

q2∗

q1∗

(a) S(q1∗ ) = S(q2∗ ) = 3

q

q2∗

(b) S(q1∗ ) = 4 > 2 = S(q2∗ )

Figure A.7: The Council’s size is odd, and legislator with dip q has two peaks
Note that any site q between alternative q1∗ and q2∗ is defeated by either q1∗ or q2∗ . So,
the only interesting competition is between the extremes q1∗ and q2∗ . The legislator for
whom q is a dip point has two peak points q1∗ and q2∗ . Thus he or she is indifferent
between those peaks during a pairwise opposition when they are candidates. It follows
that |V (q1∗ , q2∗ )| + |V (q2∗ , q1∗ )| < n, while S(q1∗ ) + S(q2∗ ) > n. In this situation, either
S(q1∗ ) = S(q2∗ ) (see, for example, Figure A.7a) or S(q1∗ ) 6= S(q2∗ ). Without loss of
generality, we can assume S(q1∗ ) > S(q2∗ ) (see, for example, Figure A.7b). In cases
similar to Figure A.7a, the only non-defeated sites are the extreme peaks, and O(C) =
{q1∗ , q2∗ }. Otherwise, situations in Figure A.7b hold, q1∗ defeats q2∗ , and O(C) = {q1∗ }.
2. Assume that n is even. We study two different situations: each legislator has a
unique peak point or there exists at least one legislator who has two peaks over A.
Case g: n is even, and each legislator has a unique peak point. Consider q1∗ and q2∗ as
the two possible peak points, then S(q1∗ ) + S(q2∗ ) = n, with S(q1∗ ) ≥ 0 and S(q2∗ ) ≥ 0.
a) Assume that S(q1∗ ) > S(q2∗ ), then S(q1∗ ) > n2 , and S(q2∗ ) < n2 . This item is similar
to the situation already demonstrated, where n is odd (see Case a). As we proved
previously, O(C) = {q1∗ }.
b) Suppose that S(q1∗ ) = S(q2∗ ) = n2 . In an opposition between in the Council q1∗ and
q2∗ , there is no winner. Let q ∈ A be a candidate such that S(q) = 0, and oppose this
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site to the peak point q1∗ in a pairwise opposition. Legislators for whom q1∗ is a dip
point will vote for q and individuals for whom q1∗ is a peak point will vote for q1∗ . Also,
individuals for whom q is the dip point will vote for q1∗ , although the latter is not their
ideal point. Since S(q1∗ ) = n2 , it follows that |V (q1∗ , q)| > n2 , and q1∗ defeats q. Therefore,
all other sites between q1∗ and q2∗ are defeated either by q1∗ or q2∗ . Consequently, q1∗ and
q2∗ are the only non-defeated sites, and O(C) = {q1∗ , q2∗ }.
Case h: n is even and there exists at least one legislator who has two peaks over A.
Then, the one of the following situations hold: (a) S(q1∗ ) > S(q2∗ ) (see, for example,
Figure A.8a and Figure A.8b); (b) S(q1∗ ) < S(q2∗ ) (see, for example, Figure A.8c); and
(c) S(q1∗ ) = S(q2∗ ) (see, for example, Figure A.8d). Individuals for whom q or q 0 is
the dip point have two peak points q1∗ and q2∗ , thus there are indifferent between those
peaks during a pairwise opposition where they are candidates.
Given a situation in Figure A.8, we have |V (q1∗ , q2∗ )| + |V (q2∗ , q1∗ )| < n, while S(q1∗ ) +
S(q2∗ ) > n.
i) However, in situations similar to the ones described in Figure A.8a, although,
|V (q1∗ , q2∗ )| < S(q1∗ ), we have |V (q1∗ , q2∗ )| > n2 , and |V (q2∗ , q1∗ ) < S(q2∗ ) < n2 . Given
that there is no other site that is majority-preferred to q1∗ , it follows that q1∗
defeats q2∗ , O(C) = {q1∗ }.
ii) In situations illustrated in Figure A.8b or Figure A.8c or Figure A.8d, it follows that
O(C) = {q1∗ , q2∗ }. In fact, in Figure A.8b, |V (q1∗ , q2∗ )| < S(q1∗ ) and |V (q1∗ , q2∗ )| = n2 ,
while |V (q2∗ , q1∗ )| < S(q2∗ ) =

n
.
2

We have the reverse in Figure A.8c. In Figure

A.8d, it holds that |V (q1∗ , q2∗ )| < S(q1∗ ), |V (q2∗ , q1∗ )| < S(q2∗ ), with |V (q1∗ , q2∗ )| <
n
2

< S(q1∗ ) and |V (q2∗ , q1∗ )| <

n
2

< S(q2∗ ).



Proof (Proof of Theorem 2) For any x ∈ A, we denote PC (x) = {y ∈ A : y C x},
S
C ∈ M and P (x) = {y ∈ A : y  x}, and P (x) =
PC (x). Consider h the mapping
C∈M

from A to the real numbers, and define h(x) = L(P (x)), for any x ∈ A, and L the
Lebesgue measure.
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(a) S(q1∗ ) = 5 > 2 = S(q2∗ )

q1∗

q1∗

q

q0

(b) S(q1∗ ) = 4 > 3 = S(q2∗ )

q2∗

q1∗

q2∗

q1∗

(c) S(q1∗ ) = 3 < 4 = S(q2∗ )

q0

q

q2∗

q

q2∗

(d) S(q1∗ ) = S(q2∗ ) = 4

Figure A.8: The Council’s size is even, and legislator with dip q or q 0 has two peaks
1. h is lower semi-continuous.
Let x0 ∈ A. Consider a sequence xl which converges to x0 when l tends to
infinity and show that lim inf h(xl ) ≥ h(x0 ). Let y ∈ P (x0 ), then there exists
l→∞

C ∈ M such that y ∈ PC (x0 ). xl converges to x0 and PC is continuous, thus
for l sufficiently large, y ∈ PC (xl ). It follows that y ∈ lim inf PC (xl ) for some
C ∈ M, and then y ∈ lim inf P (xl ), so P (x0 ) ⊆ lim inf P (xl ). Since there exS
ists l0 such that L( P (xl )) < ∞, then L(lim inf P (xl )) ≤ lim inf L(P (xl )),
l→∞

l≥l0

l→∞

i.e., L(lim inf P (xl )) ≤ lim inf h(xl ), since h(xl ) = L(P (xl )). Since P (x0 ) ⊆
l→∞

l→∞

lim inf P (xl ), then L(P (x0 )) ≤ L(lim inf P (xl )) and therefore h(x0 ) ≤ lim inf h(xl ).
l→∞

l→∞

2. h is lower semi-continuous and A compact, then h attains a minimum on A, i.e.,
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there exists a ∈ A such that h(a) = inf h(x).
x∈A


n
S
Denote by S = a ∈ A : h(a) = inf h(x) and LM = [LM (i , A)]. Consider
x∈A

i=1

the binary relation  defined as follows: (1) for x, y ∈ A and C ⊂ N , y C x
if y C x and z C x for all z ∈
/ LM such that z  y; and (2) y  x if there
exists C ∈ M such that y C x. Let V(C) = {x ∈ A : not(y  x), y ∈ A}.
3. V(C) is non-empty.
Assume the contrary and consider an arbitrary site x0 ∈ S, and x0 ∈
/ V(C). There
exists an alternative site x1 ∈ A and C ∈ M such that x1 C x0 i.e., x1 C x0
and z C x0 for any z ∈ A such that z  x1 and z ∈
/ LM . It follows that
P (x1 ) ⊆ P (x0 ) ∪ (P (x1 ) ∩ LM ), and L(P (x1 )) ≤ L(P (x0 )) + L(P (x1 ) ∩ LM ) ≤
n
n
S
P
L(P (x0 )) + L(LM ). Since LM = [LM (i , A)], then L(LM ) ≤
L[LM (i
i=1

i=1

, A)] and L[LM (i , A)] = 0 for all i = 1, ..., n by hypothesis, therefore L(LM ) = 0
and L(P (x1 )) ≤ L(P (x0 )) i.e., h(x1 ) ≤ h(x0 ). Since h(x0 ) = inf h(x), then the
x∈A

inequality h(x1 ) ≤ h(x0 ) implies that h(x1 ) = h(x0 ) and x1 ∈ S. We note two
different situations described below.
Situation 1: Assume there exists a neighborhood S(x1 ) for which there is no
y ∈ S(x1 ) satisfying y  x1 . x1  x0 and preferences are continuous, then there
exists a neighborhood S 0 (x1 ) ⊆ S(x1 ) such that y  x0 for all y ∈ S 0 (x1 ). It
follows that S 0 (x1 ) ⊆ P (x0 ) and S 0 (x1 ) ⊆ (A − P (x1 )). Thus, P (x1 ) ( P (x0 )
and h(x1 ) < h(x0 ), which is a contradiction.
Situation 2: For all neighborhood S(x1 ) of x1 , there exists an alternative y ∈
S(x1 ) such that, y  x1 . Let x2 be a site such that x2 C 0 x1 . As previously,
P (x2 ) ⊆ P (x1 ) ∪ (P (x1 ∩ LM )) and then h(x2 ) = h(x1 ). We have x2  x1
and preferences are continuous, thus there exists a neighborhood S(x1 ) such that
x2  a for any a ∈ S(x1 ). By assumption, there exists y ∈ S(x1 ) such that
y  x1 . By continuity of preferences, there exists a neighborhood S(y) of y
such that y 0  x1 for any y 0 ∈ S(y). Hence for all y 0 ∈ S(y) ∩ S(x1 ), we have
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y 0  x1 and x2  y 0 , so h(x1 ) > h(y 0 ) and h(y 0 ) > h(x2 ), then h(x1 ) > h(x2 ), a
contradiction.
Therefore, V(C) is non-empty.
4. Let x0 ∈ V(C), prove that x0 ∈ O(C).
Assume that x0 ∈
/ O(C), then there exists x1 ∈ A and C ∈ M such that x1 mC x0 .
Let z ∈
/ LM such that z T x1 , for T ∈ M. We would like to demonstrate that
z C x0 . First, note that z T x1 , and x1 mC x0 implies that z C x0 .
a) If z i x0 for any i ∈ C, then z C x0 and x1  x0 , which is a contradiction.
b) Assume that there exists i ∈ C such that z ∼i x0 . z T x1 and preferences
are continuous, then there exists a neighborhood S(z) such that z 0 T x1
/ LM (i , A) for any i ∈ N .
for all z 0 ∈ S(z). Because z ∈
/ LM , then z ∈
Hence, there exists z 0 ∈ S(z) such that z i z 0 . Since, z ∼i x0 , then
x0 i z 0 by transitivity. Also, z 0 ∈ S(z), therefore x0 i z 0 T x1 i x0
and by transitivity, x0 i x0 if i ∈ C ∩ T . Otherwise, if i ∈
/ T , then, given
that T ∩ C 6= ∅, there exists i0 ∈ T ∩ C such that x0 i0 z 0 i0 x1 i0 x0
or x0 i0 x0 by transitivity, which is a contradiction and x0 ∈
/ V(C). In
conclusion, x0 ∈ O(C).
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